

Strategy Research Project

The Reserve Forces Impact On Theater Security Cooperation

by

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United States Army War College
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Abstract

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Reserve Components have a greater affect on Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) than Active Duty Components. The entire Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME) on Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (PMESII) construct with respect to TSC, is directly affected more by Department of Defense (DoD) Reserve programs than by Active Duty efforts. Upcoming reductions in money, people, equipment, and training applied to Reserve TSC agendas will directly weaken international partnerships and therefore, may exacerbate instability and insecurity in combatant theaters worldwide. In the approaching years resource cuts will characterize and define the U.S. defense system. Global security may be disproportionately threatened by DoD cuts to reserve TSC programs.

The Reserve Forces Impact On Theater Security Cooperation

Nations must harmonize their interests with others in stable and secure environments to coexist and develop. Militaries protect national interests. Explaining United States (U.S.) intervention in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) actions in Libya, on March 28, 2011, President Obama said the U.S. employs military force “in the case of genocide, humanitarian relief, regional security or economic interests.”¹ Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) is a Phase 0 (shaping) instrument of regional commanders and is applied with the intent of precluding the use of military force. The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Theater Campaign Planning Handbook describes Phase 0 operations as “those shaping activities that are designed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and assure friends, as well as to set conditions for the contingency plan (such as infrastructure building) and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities.”²

Stability in regions like the European theater, is not a foregone conclusion. In the wake of the Cold War, security conditions throughout Europe have been stable and predictable however, this can all change in an instant. In December of 2010, Prime Minister Putin claimed that “Russia would deploy nuclear weapons and strike forces if it were shut out of a Western missile shield, adding punch to a warning from President Dmitry Medvedev.”³ To counter-balance such threats, TSC through partnerships between the U.S. and European allies is critical to the national interest of both parties.

U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) Admiral Keating said “The Pacific theater poses unique requirements. Five of the seven security treaties to which the U.S. is a party Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand - reside within USPACOM's area of responsibility (AOR). Ensuring the ability to meet these

obligations is a key focus of the training strategy and USPACOM's TSC Plan.”⁴ The global interdependencies of our strategic environment mean that instabilities and insecurities in one region of the world will affect other regions because of the interconnected nature of the international system.

Thesis Statement

Reserve Components have a greater affect on Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) than Active Duty Components. The entire Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME) on Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (PMESII) construct with respect to TSC, is directly affected more by Department of Defense (DoD) Reserve programs than by Active Duty efforts. Upcoming reductions in money, people, equipment, and training applied to Reserve TSC agendas will directly weaken international partnerships and therefore, may exacerbate instability and insecurity in combatant theaters worldwide. In the approaching years resource cuts will characterize and define the U.S. defense system. Global security may be disproportionately threatened by DoD cuts to reserve TSC programs.

Approach and Main Points

Reserve TSC programs foster partnerships in three significant ways. The research findings underpinning this paper provide a clear narrative about the value of Reserve TSC programs in the context of the total force of Active, Reserve, and National Guard. First, quantitatively, most nations put more emphasis on reserve militaries than active militaries and therefore, having fewer professional soldiers and more reserve soldiers makes reserve programs more impactful. Second, qualitatively, because reservists are part civilian, their contribution in the national fabric is usually far more comprehensive than that of active component counterparts. Finally, the strategic

influence of reserve and retired general officer (GO) leaders is significant. GOs continue to influence national and international systems and policies well beyond retirement, and therefore, the attention of government officials, both civilian and military.

There is justification and validity in U.S. strategy to provide assistance to partner nations in support of our own national interests. In his December address to the Army War College, Admiral Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) and Combatant Commander (CCDR) of the European Command (EUCOM) emphasized that “building partner capacity is one foundational imperative for U.S. future national security.”⁵ To understand this, the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General Amos only two weeks later, stressed that military leaders understand quite well that the U.S. “re-balancing” initiative will be forged on “international relationships and interdependency”.⁶ In the end, politics and subjectivity are used to decide how our assistance and defense budgets are allocated, and not objective criteria for an effects based process.

Examples of economic instability abound. “European wealth” is a misnomer. The European Union (EU) has fallen on difficult economic times and is susceptible to continued financial strife. Most U.S. foreign aid is directed at arming nations in the middle-east and Africa for example, Israel and Egypt. Very few European nations for example, the Ukraine and Bosnia receive significant assistance.⁷ Strong alliances with European countries through military activity acts as a security foundation in the absence of other support means.

The Contemporary Strategic Environment

Today’s strategic environment is described by the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) as Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA). Theories for handling VUCA problems span from the scientific to artistic. Strategists search this

range endlessly for approaches to frame and solve VUCA problems. History has presented leaders and decision makers with varying scenarios that test their ability to find approaches to solving VUCA problems across the PMESII environment on the sea, air, and landscape over time. Thucydides wrote about the complex differences between the Spartan agrarian and Athenian trade societies. Hitler's threat of world domination was volatile and certain. Although context changes, VUCA problems persist. Theorist Carl von Clausewitz's theories best describe methods for dealing with VUCA challenges in the 21st Century. Clausewitz's theories transcend changing PMESII conditions and are irrespective of time. Clausewitz said "...war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."⁸ This theory is a function of human social interaction, a key ingredient in Clausewitz's strategic environment.

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) lists the following key areas of study in today's strategic environment: cyber security and cyber warfare, the future of strategic competition in the global commons, national security implications of changes to the world economy, the nexus between transnational crime and national security, and natural security: the geo-strategic and policy implications of rising global consumption of resources including energy, minerals, water, and climate change.⁹ In general, CNAS' focus highlights the most significant challenges for actors in the twenty first century. The goal of these national actors is to balance their ends, ways, and means to coexist and prevent warring over interests.

The "citizen-soldier" (military reservist) plays a vital role in TSC. Systemically speaking, reservists typically influence the strategic environment in a broader way than their active component (AC) counterparts. The "environment" is defined by a Political,

Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) construct. There are various types of influence or pressures that can be applied to a system or in this case, a strategic environment, to change it. In applying Sun Tzu's theories, governments attempt to influence others by using policies and actions in order to compel them to do their will.¹⁰ Throughout history, this tension has existed. In today's vernacular, Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) are the influencing actions while the resultant impacts are typically characterized as PMESII effects.

Evolutionarily, philosophers and advisors began to slowly develop methods to analyze the political, economic, military, and social repercussions of statecraft in a manner that allowed it to move beyond the throne room and into the supporting bureaucracies, entrepreneurial organizations, and educated population.¹¹ As time moved ahead by a few hundred years, the categories of "effects" have become more refined and prescriptive. In 2008, the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) described PMESII as "foundation and features of an enemy (or ally) state and can help determine the state's strengths and weaknesses, as well as help estimate the effects various actions will have on states across these areas."¹² Reservists have a tremendous influence on PMESII effects in any given scenario in the TSC effort.

Scene Setting Example in EUCOM

The Confederation of Inter-allied Officers of the Reserve (CIOR) is a reserve TSC program that has been in existence since 1948 and is identified in the 2008 United States (U.S.) Global Employment of the Force (GEF) document. About CIOR's purpose, the organization states "...in addition to their roles as reserve officers, many individual delegates of CIOR are highly accomplished business and industrial leaders, public servants and academics. They are therefore in a unique position to contribute to

a better understanding of security and defense issues in the population as a whole, as well as bringing civilian expertise and experience to the tasks and challenges facing reserve forces in NATO.”¹³ By charter, this organization strengthens relationships amongst NATO (and guest) members, shares best military reserve practices with allied nations, and collectively shapes the future of military reserve programs. CIOR commissions include communities and programs in the fields of medicine, law, young officers, military skills, media, and more.

In 2006, after 3 years in the Global War On Terror, the U.S. CIOR program lost favor at the highest levels in the military. Executive sponsorship was revoked by the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). The USARC cited “operational commitments” as the primary reason for its withdrawn support for the program.¹⁴ Since that time, the U.S. has continued to participate in CIOR events on an ad hoc basis. In the past five years, because of lack of support by the U.S., other nations have dramatically cut back their support for the program as well. In 2010 Colonel Ian Webster of the United Kingdom (UK) CIOR delegation said “the U.S.’s demonstrated indifference has spurred the UK’s neglect as well.”¹⁵ At the annual NATO summer congress of 2012, the program experienced a little more than half of the robust attendance it enjoyed in the half century prior to 2000. This affect was counter to an increased focus on reservists in operational capacity contributing to the combat operations overseas.

Quantity: Nations Have More Reserve Forces

Although a comprehensive roll-up is speculative, some sources approximate the ratio of reserve to active duty soldiers in global militaries at 2:1.¹⁶ Potentially, there are twice as many international military members in some reserve capacity than there are in the active services. Conversely, The U.S. currently has a ratio of almost 1:2.¹⁷ In terms

of “economy of force”, the small number of U.S. reservists have the opportunity to incite the larger number of partnered national service members.

Compulsory military service, conscription, around the world, is evaporating. Along with conscription’s wane has been the waxing of the professional and reserve services. Juhn and Zeldon point out, in their paper on conscription in the summer of 2011 that only eight European countries still retain some form of conscription in Europe and will maintain this military practice farther into the 21st century.¹⁸ Other nation states globally show similar declining trends of the same magnitude.

There are some compelling worldwide reserve TSC opportunities in nations similar to the U.S. having democratic governments and likenesses in a philosophical constitution as it applies to citizenry and society. In the following 2013 list compiled from Global Fire Power statistics, the reserve to active component ratio suggests a propensity for reservists to have a greater influence on their surrounding societies through sheer numbers.¹⁹

Country, Reserve:Active, (#Reserve, #Active)

Canada .7:1 (47K, 68K)

New Zealand .3:1 (2.4K, 8.6K)

United Kingdom .8:1 (187K, 224K)

Australia .6:1 (29K, 47K)

Germany 2.4:1 (355K, 148K)

France 1.2:1 (419K, 362K)

Total: 1.2:1 (1M, 860K)

In total, the size of the reserve force in this pool is larger than the active force. Looking ahead, like the U.S., in the wake of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and in austere fiscal times, over the next five years the United Kingdom will reduce active component force numbers. The United Kingdom will increase their reserve component personnel however, by fifty percent while the U.S. adjusts reserve force numbers minimally.²⁰ Voluntary military service is growing globally and the reserve components are flourishing.

In some Combatant Commands (CCMD) the percentage of Reservists performing key TSC missions is far greater than active duty. In 2010, General William Ward, former commander of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), reported reservists already make up 90 percent of the forces performing TSC missions in support of USAFRICOM. In recognizing that majority he added that the quality of U.S. forces by saying “when [African] soldiers meet our soldiers …they see the best in America.”²¹ The role the Guard and Reserve plays in that is vital. Because the reserves possesses dual-hat personnel, civilian experience, and equipment to support certain Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) missions, it would be prudent to plan, budget, and allocate resources to maximize the reserve contributions to CCDR’s TSC programs and theater engagement missions.²²

Partnerships across the globe that are developed and strengthened by reserve TSC programs go far beyond influencing military alliances. Concerning the Naval Expeditionary Component Command (NECC) Rear Admiral Tillotson said: "We're now deployed on seven continents, 40 countries, creating partnerships and delivering combat power."²³ The Admiral was commenting on a 2006 U.S. initiative as part of the

"Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century" to provide a maritime force that would augment the Coast Guard and Marine Corps mainly in the littoral and riverine environments of ungoverned and under-governed countries. Since over 90 percent of global commerce is moving by sea, U.S. security and presence in these sometimes lawless regions of our Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC) can be risky "NECC's forces are 50 percent Reserves, and Reservists are rotated in like Active Duty, they are key to our mission success"²⁴ the Admiral said. Most reserve units are on a 48-month/eight-month training and deployment cycle that allows time for specialized training. A key element of the NECC mission is theater security cooperation and engagement. Admiral Tillotson's organization consists of half reserve and half active forces assigned to him.

Regarding the Marine Corps emphasis on reserves in TSC, General Amos reiterated a critical theme during his visit to the USAWC on December 18, 2012. The General identified that the Marine Forces Reserve's continued level of support to geographic CCDR's TSC and Phase 0 shaping operations as well as maintaining readiness across the total force is critical to enable more flexible force sourcing.²⁵ Not only do CCDRs achieve economies of scale (fewer and cheaper forces) through Reserve Component (RC) use but, because of the military-civilian hybrid capabilities reservists bring, the quality and effectiveness of influence is greatly enhanced.

Reserve Service Members Have Increased Effectiveness on the PMESII Environment

Reservists have more influence on international and national dynamics than their active duty counterparts. The "citizen-soldier" is generally rooted in a classic societal norm in which their demographics reflect their surrounding communities. Being embedded in the workforce, civic structure, neighborhoods, and personal relationships

for sustained periods allows for a deeper capacity for the reservist to exert influence across the entire PMESII spectrum. In July of 2012, speaking on the Importance of Reserve families, U.S. Army Reserve Major General Marcia Anderson said:

The Army Reserve is a diverse force of men and women from all walks of life who have committed themselves to serving their country, their families and their communities by volunteering in our nation's military. We are proud to have one of the highest percentages of women across the military. Our force also includes more African American officers than the DoD average, and nearly 40 percent of our Soldiers are minorities—the highest proportion of any branch of the armed forces. As Reserve Soldiers, we live and work in the communities that we serve, and we acutely understand the importance of reflecting the diversity and vitality of those communities.²⁶

Reservists represent a cross-sectional slice of societal norms. As “soldiers-citizens”, they lead and understand the lives of civilian counterparts. The reservist is more likely to buy groceries from the local market, receive dental care from the community dentist, work at the corner pharmacy or auto parts store. On the other hand, active duty members are quite opposite in all of these respects. Reservists therefore, are more closely in touch with all of the PMESII characteristics of a society. A closer analysis of the “P” in PMESII is in order, in this regard.

From a Political perspective, in his writings titled “Politicians in the Ranks,” Army Colonel Steve Strong points out that while on Title 10 Active Duty, military members are unable to hold political office. None-the-less, Strong says “politicians are eligible to retain reserve commissions.”²⁷ By law, Section 973(b) and DODD 1344.10, Congressmen are allowed to hold reserve commissions. On average, reservists only serve two weeks of active duty each year. With this design reservists can and do work throughout the political arena. Roughly ninety percent of a reservist’s professional life is spent as a civilian. If you consider that they are only “on-duty” for two days out of each

month, one “drill weekend,” reservists tend to be more involved in local politics than active duty counterparts simply because of their time in the community. A recent study showed there are 15,000 U.S. military reservists living the Washington D.C. area and working in some political capacity.

Looking at economics, there is a profound difference between reserve and active duty effects on the economy from a number of standpoints. Many reservists own companies and employ people. This is very uncommon among active duty service members. As a corollary, unemployment is a gauge for joblessness and directly reflects economic conditions.²⁸ Active Duty service members are not counted in that number. Because reservists are public and private sector employees, business owners and executives, they understand and connect with the general public on issues of unemployment and underpowered economies.

There can be no better example of civilian’s social influence on the military than in health sciences. Doctors are typically granted immediate reserve commissions upon request. Doctors can become service members in about one month in the Direct Commissioned Officer Program.²⁹ The medical field is a recognized source of professionals because of the standards in education, proficiency, certification, and expectation that society bestows on the community. Similarly, nurses enjoy open accessions into the reserve commissioning system and are consistently in a high-demand skill area. Beyond the medical field, the legal profession and clergy are both expedient pipelines into the reserve officer community.

Governments at the federal, state, and local levels provide infrastructure for even the most basic of human needs. Roads, railways, electricity, telephone, waste

management, and water distribution are all part of basic infrastructure. Although active service members are skilled in short-term establishment of these necessities, development arms of government and private organizations employ civilians that are experts at creating and maintaining permanent infrastructure. Approximately one third of reservists hold infrastructure related jobs.³⁰ Active duty members may train constantly at building infrastructure and arguably may become proficient in rebuilding villages and cities torn apart by war but, reservists work every day building, maintaining, and designing cutting edge infrastructure systems.

In the realm of information in PMESII, mass communication systems reach out to the public by way of civilian channels to create, edit, and disseminate information. Military systems are mostly secured from public access. The roles played by active duty communications specialists are centralized within the military while reservists regularly work in public media.

This paper has now made the case that the quantity and quality of reserve forces impacts the TSC mission more beneficially than active duty component. How then, can governments be convinced to use reservists for this mission? One way is through lobby organizations.

The Strategic Role of Reserve General Officers - Lobby Organizations and Retired/Reserve General Officers

A primary senior leader role is to exemplify the traits of his or her profession and work towards continuing the succession, raising the standards, and institutionalizing values and principles of the profession.

Private organizations represent commerce and give foundation to economies. The executive leaders of these organizations, in many cases, are retired and reserve

senior military officials. The reserve general officer is a senior leader and is charged with helping to articulate the strategic purpose of the reserves to civilian political leaders. Major General Robert Smith, a retired Army Reserve senior leader and international business executive for the Ford Motor Company said "...the perspective of the reservist is more closely rooted in societal norms than active duty members."³¹ Wearing their other "hat" as members, workers, contributors to private organizations, the reservist brings the unique perspective of an employee or entrepreneur. Private organizations conduct themselves under different rules than ministries of defense.

Remembering that CCDRs must understand their operational environment, the economic effects of PMESII are evident in commerce increased by business transactions. Civilians understand the nuances of the private workforce far better than active duty military members. This puts the reservist in a more reflective position than active duty personnel. Their influence is deep and reaches to the halls of staff-level institutions in the Pentagon and Capitol Hill. National security is at the top of governmental agendas. It takes lobbies to promote reserve programs that strengthen TSC further ensuring our national security.

Lobby organizations influence political environments. The goal of military lobby organizations is to "monitor governmental activity, seek to shape public opinion, and intervene in the policy process."³² Lobby organizations represent the interests of constituencies, identify issues, and influence policy makers by assisting in gathering and presenting information that diverse organizations bring to Congress. Because of the diverse complexion of the members in race, ethnicities, demographics, age, gender, culture, etc, these organizations can influence the legitimacy of governments, causes,

or purposes. Through TSC, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) organizations offer CCDRs the opportunity to compound their political legitimacy within the regional environment. In describing future operational environments, the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept says “since irregular warfare is a contest for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations, the populations carry particular weight as both the battleground and object of the conflict.”³³

Testimonials from Reserve Officers

Organized senior leaders represent credible, legitimate, and authoritative positions. RADM Paul Kayye is a retired U.S. Navy Reserve medical officer and retired private practice psychiatrist. In 2004 he served as the president of one of ROA’s six major commissions in a critical lobby role. About the legitimacy of the Inter-allied Medical Reserve component of ROA, the Admiral discussed the virtue of this professional organization in that it has a “seat at the table” in discussing strategic issues regarding National Security and Defense Education. The Reserve Chiefs of Staffs regularly dialog with the ROA to share and listen to diverse points of view. Regarding the ROA’s role he said, “...the value of the organization is in their collective credentials, recognized authorities, and influential position to gather and disseminate information from DoD and the services.” Kayye says that through publications, newsletters, journals, and websites the ROA “informs the general public and corporations about trends, innovations, and legislation regarding reserve issues.”³⁴ These organizations act as credible catalysts for informing and pushing strategic positions.

The Diplomacy, Development, Defense (3D) Planning Guide is an instrument for alignment and underpins efforts to maximize “understanding across U.S. military services and government agencies.”³⁵ CCDRs must include 3D across their staffs to

facilitate later operations. TSC events are amongst the primary lines of effort in conducting 3D in the CCMD. The ROA's charter for example, promises that the organization will "support and promote the development and execution of a military policy for the United States that will provide adequate National Security."³⁶ There are approximately 60,000 Americans in the ranks of the ROA alone.³⁷ As an advocate for reservists this organization is one of many. Although none of these groups has the specific mission of maintaining TSC programs most have a position on critical regional issues such as Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe or Violent Extremism in Africa.

Professionals provide a respected and recognized service to society. Few are given the honor of this trusted capacity. To society, doctors provide health care, lawyers provide legal protection, and military service members provide security. Professionals are only professional if society chooses to adorn, afford, and trust them with this recognition. Regarding trust, the profession of arms requires stewardship and servant leadership in order to retain its trusted status. During his presentation about the "The Profession of Arms," Dr. Don M. Snider said "the military is not an organization, it is an institution" characterized by honor, expertise, trust, esprit de corps, and stewardship.³⁸ These five basic tenants of the military profession must be upheld in order to keep societies confident, respectful, and trusting of its value. In the 1940's while in North Africa then Major General George Patton wrote to his West Point classmates "[Some] did not turn and run because we were more afraid of our consciences than we were of the enemy."³⁹ Patton observed that military service members are the purest example of a professional. The willingness to sacrifice one's own life for the charter of their profession is the greatest of honorable acts.

Major General (Retired) Robert Kasulke is a retired Army Reserve Medical Officer. His professional career was as a private sector surgeon. He currently presides as the ROA Confederation of Inter-allied Officers of the Medical Reserve (CIOMR) president. For 32 years, the combination of MG Kasulke's private and reserve medical professions had him rooted in professional principles, values, standards, certifications, practices, and technologies. One area of focus for CIOMR is in the development and synthesis of commonalities among partner nation reserve forces in Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC). When asked about the value professionals bring societies he posited that "professionals understand societies/communities and bring education and experience to know what services are required."⁴⁰ In the case of health infrastructure systems he cited several examples of "remedies" where medical professionals provide counsel. In Nigeria, there is a deficit of polio vaccinations; in South America there are needs for purification is spoiled water, prophylactics, and typhoid, malaria, and yellow fever vaccines. Professions provide life sustaining services to global communities and underpin systems (health, judicial, military) that provide stability to TSC efforts.

Retired Attorney General (Iowa), private trial lawyer, and Army Reserve Major General Evan L. Hultman, discusses his role as "twice the citizens" and politician in advising on National Security affairs committees during the Cold War.⁴¹ General Hultman's political sway was used in representing his constituents in decisions about locating ballistic missile defense systems in the United States. MG Hultman said "my role was to bring civilian and political perspective and influence to decisions, to be receptive of this capability, they relied on their experience."⁴² In June 2002, "Hultman

was part of a task force to spread peace and democracy.”⁴³ He strongly believes that his role as the member of a community gives him a “dimension of uniqueness.”⁴⁴

Retired Army Reserve Brigadier General Gerald Griffin was assigned to Camp Ashraf in 2004 during Operation Iraqi Freedom II.⁴⁵ His role was to study “detainee to refugee status of Iraqi forces.”⁴⁶ He was chosen to conduct the study because of his own experience as an immigrant, a civilian, and as a reservist, and is yet another example of a professional bringing diverse talent to help solve complex problems.

Counter Argument

Some would say that active or professional military entities have greater influence on TSC. The vast majority of a professional soldier’s influence though, is on the military aspect of the security environment. Influence within that sphere only, does affect elements of the other PMESII attributes but, through a military to military only conduit. The focus of “wars amongst the people” today is population centric. Harnessing the will of the people is essential. Only civilian-military avenues can have the strongest lasting effect. The citizen-soldier is the hybrid answer.

Militarily, active components are engaged in TSC worldwide, constantly. There is, however, increasingly strong reliance on the reservist’s contributions in exercises, staffing, liaison, and the total TSC effort in general. The Army’s Contingency Expeditionary Force initiative is an example.⁴⁷ On average, across the CCMDs, the reservist fills more than 50% of manning billets of the over one hundred multinational exercises the U.S. conducts annually.⁴⁸ There is tremendous potential for influence by reservists. Annually, the CCDRs develop their training guidance based upon an assessment of their mission requirements. These training activities are divided into two categories - Service and Joint. Service training employs both active component and

reserve component service doctrine, along with interoperability requirements identified by the CCDR needed to execute assigned missions. Conversely, joint training focuses on staff mission activities designed to support operational and tactical requirements.

Reserve component capabilities in the CCDRs Area Of Responsibility (AOR) engagement activities significantly enhance service-training activities.⁴⁹

Recommendations and Conclusion

U.S. Reserve programs falling under the CCDRs will have more leverage to affect regional stability and security only if the programs are strengthened in the following ways:

- The U.S. Department of Defense must shift ratios in U.S. defense manning to at least one to one - active to reserve. This may be accomplished through transfers to the reserves from active duty by the use of benefits and bonuses.
- Congress must make reserve programs more robust, emphasizing their value, and providing reservists responsibility for these programs. They must decide to apportion a greater piece of defense budgets to reserve programs and develop doctrine to institutionalize the practice.
- Militaries must allow reserve and retired organization leaders to help direct, coordinate, and organize the TSC effort.

Reserve programs are under-utilized, not given the respect they deserve, and have the potential to garner strategic effect with minimal resources. Statistics show that global partners emphasize their reserve militaries. The scale of the reserve entity makes it a wieldy force where comparatively small investments can create large amounts of change. Reserve programs directly impact the entire PMESII environment

in a more meaningful way than do active duty programs. Retired reserve senior officers have a powerful influence on businesses, governments, and national security in general. This paper shows that reserve forces are better suited to affect theater security because of their unique dual-hat roles in society and the military.

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